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This paper aims at the provision of applicable recommendations for institutions and 
actors involved regarding the EMU accession process both in CEE and in the euro-
zone. In order to provide topical advice, the first part, on markets, will concentrate on 
theory and empirics of labour markets, financial markets and foreign direct 
investment, whereas the second part, dealing with policies, will put emphasis on 
exchange rates, FDI, labour markets, and the social dimension. It turns out that 
benefits and losses of EMU accession may differ with regard to the different issue 
areas. To get to clear-cut recommendations, diverging impacts and their balance 
have been taken into consideration. Special regard has been given to divergent 
groups of winners and losers during accession, its impact on the political decision-
making process, and ways to compensate for them. 
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I. Policy Advice: Markets 
 
Katarzyna Żukrowska, Dominik Sobczak, Joanna Stryjek, Piotr Bańbuła 
 
 
I. 1. Introduction 
 
Discussion on the strategy of entering the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and 
introducing the common currency in Accession Countries is often centred on fulfilling the 
convergence criteria set out in Maastricht. However, as it is often underlined in recent 
months by the Commission, researchers, as well as fiscal and monetary authorities of these 
countries, high degree of real convergence is also crucial in order to benefit from the euro 
and prevent destabilisation in the whole Eurozone. 
Real convergence means, that real spheres of the economy, such as labour markets, 
financial markets and regulations for foreign investments, should also be well prepared for 
operating in the single currency area. This report is devoted to this very subject. The 
authors try to answer the question to what extent the real spheres of economy are prepared 
for euro adoption and what should be done in order to prepare them better. What 
adjustments should be made? What reforms implemented? What pattern are there to be 
followed? The report tries to identify best practices in various spheres. Practices which are 
derived from the experiences of current EMU members. 
The report focuses on three main segments of economy, segments which will be very 
significantly influenced by the euro adoption. They are, as mentioned above, labour 
markets, financial markets and foreign direct investments (FDI). The report also tries to 
give some insights into the answer to a key question of time: when accession countries 
should enter the EMU?; what are the arguments from the point of view of the discussed 
segments of economy? 
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I. 2. Financial Markets 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
Effective and developed financial markets are certainly very important in current 
market economies. Since the implementation of the common currency in the European 
Union this became even more true, as a gradual shift from the continental to the Anglo-
Saxon model of business financing is observed. In young market economies of accession 
countries, financial markets are still very much underdeveloped, but they are soon about to 
face the challenge of introducing the euro. In this context it is important to answer two 
general questions: “What is more beneficial for these markets – quicker or slower euro 
adoption?” and “How to prepare these young financial market to stand up to this 
challenge?”. This text elaborates mainly on these two issues. 
 
2.2   Financial markets in accession countries 
 
Since the system change at the beginning of the 90s only fifteen years have passed, yet 
the financial markets and their institutions in Accession countries went through a dramatic 
change. It must be noticed that centrally planned economies did not include the majority 
of activities normally existing in market economies, thus almost everything had to be 
created from scratch. Financial markets were shaped by two fundamental processes – 
transition to market economy and EU accession negotiations. During this time much has 
changed in the legal and institutional environment of Accession Countries. 
 
2.2.2  Capital markets 
First exchanges were opened at the beginning of the 90s (Budapest Stock Exchange 
and Ljubljana Stock Exchange – 1990, Warsaw Stock Exchange – 1991, Prague Stock 
Exchange, Bratislava Stock Exchange and National Stock Exchange of Lithuania – 1993) 
and some in the later period (Budapest Stock Exchange and Riga Stock Exchange – 1995, 
Tallinn Stock Exchange and Cyprus Stock Exchange – 1996). The emergence of stock 
markets was closely associated with the privatisation process, yet the direct approach of 
specific countries was different. In some of them, like the Czech Republic, the Slovak 
Republic and Lithuania, capital markets were only supportive to massive voucher 
privatisations and were established even before sound and competent frameworks and   6 
 
regulations were in place. Countries that followed more traditional approach, with trading 
practices being established in the first place, were Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and 
Slovenia. In these markets number of shares listed was gradually increasing over time. 
These two approaches were not without consequences for future shape of the stock 
exchanges, as liberal attitude proved to create numerous shortcomings of the existent 
market participants. Still, the capitalization of most of the stock exchanges in Accession 
Counties is negligible when compared with their western counterparts. Only Warsaw 
Stock Exchange, as far as capitalization is concerned, is comparable with exchanges in the 
EU, but still only with the smallest ones, namely Luxemburg (USD 31,5 bln market 
capitalization) and Vienna (USD 49,2 bln market capitalization)
1. Noticeable exceptions to 
the overall trait for national exchanges are Prague (USD 14 bln market capitalization) and 
Budapest (USD 13,8 bln market capitalization). Apart from Cyprus and Ljubljana 
exchanges in other Accession Countries are still highly undeveloped, even compared only 
to their neighbours, leaving alone western markets. However, concerning the growth of 
capitalization, many of these stock markets have outperformed European and US markets, 
e.g. Tallinn Stock Exchange rose  by about 90% (January 2000 till December 2003) and 
National Stock Exchange of Lithuania by 44% (January 2002 till December 2003). 
 




























Source: www.fese.be, national stock exchanges websites. 
 
What is important for further process of European integration, securities exchange 
commissions (SECs) of candidate countries established, on May 2001, Supervisory 
                                                 
1 www.fese.be.   7 
 
Consultancy Group, which was to coordinate integration related activities. Main objectives 
of this new body were: 
• Exchanging information on the experience of regulators about introduction and 
implementation of EU directives 
• Establishing forum for consultations to the effect of full harmonization with EU 
standards. 
Bond market in candidate countries is dominated by government securities. The 
issuance of government debt securities proved to be a convenient way of financing budget 
deficits and ongoing process of restructuring will probably sustain these tendencies. 
Government bonds constitute over 90 % of overall value of the debt securities market in 
Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Poland. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia 
also have high share of bonds issued by Financial Institutions. The situation on national 
bond market is different only in Estonia where non-financial and non-monetary 
corporations took over 50% of the market
2.  
 
2.2.3  Banking sector 
Looking at capitalization and situation on debt securities market, it comes as no 
surprise that financial system in candidate states is strongly dominated by banks. At first, 
when countries had to fight with high inflation, nominal interest rates were significantly 
higher than in the Western Europe. The only exceptions were the Czech Republic and, to 
smaller extent, Slovakia. Generally two disinflation strategies have been pursued. The first 
one consisted of mixture of exchange rate targeting and inflation targeting and it was used 
in case of Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. The second one was the currency board applied 
in Baltic states. Both strategies let to reasonably low level of real interest rates, yet nominal 
interest rates and spreads are generally above those in the EU. The importance of particular 
types of credits in bank’s portfolios has also changed over time. While corporate credits 
still dominate, part of their share has been taken by household housing credits. This 
increase was possible thanks to growing stability of mortgage regulations and gradual fall in 
interest rates. 
                                                 
2  Bond Markets and Long-Term Interest rates in European Union Accession Countries, European 
Central Bank, October 2003.    8 
 
 
Table 2. Nominal credit interest rates in the commercial banks, mid 2003 
Country 
Average level of the 
nominal credit interest 
rates, mid-2003 
Interest rate margins 
(lending rate minus 
deposit rate) percentage 
points  
Lithuania 5,7  4,4 
Latvia 7  - 
Estonia 5,6  5,1 
Czech Republic  3,8  2,3 
Hungary 9,5*  2,8 
Slovenia 13*  - 
Poland 10,3  5,9 
Slovakia 8,7*  - 
Source: National central banks websites.     * data for the enterprise sector 
 
The ownership structure has also gone through profound change, as the vast 
majority of banks were state-owned. Even though transition countries lured potential 
investors with tax and licensing incentives, foreign financial institutions were reluctant to 
enter their markets. The situation started to change in the second half of the 90s when 
foreign banks took part in privatisation in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, while 
purchases in the Baltic states begun after the Russian crisis. It must be noted that foreign 
financial institutions strongly imprinted their presence in candidates counties’ banking 
sector. 
 
Table 3. Percentage share of foreign capital in the commercial banks assets  
Czech 
Republic 
Estonia Hungary  Latvia Lithuania Poland  Slovakia Slovenia 
85,8 85 90,7 68  86 70,9  95,6  16,9 
Source: K. Mérő, M. Endrész Valentinyi, The Role of Foreign Banks in Five Central and Eastern 
European Countries, National Bank of Hungary, November 2003; C. Thimann, Financial Sectors in EU 
Accession Countries, European Central Bank, July 2002. 
 
The idea behind such wide opening was creating efficient system in the absence of 
domestic capital and expertise. Foreign involvement was to import new technologies, 
know-how and best practices in banking business, as well as higher level of credibility of 
the countries themselves. Yet, such a significant share of foreign capital is not without 
consequences for financial authorities and stability of the system. Moreover, it may result 
in threat of withdrawal from the local market and closing down the bank just as a result of 
the change of the owner’s strategy. This may have little to do with the performance of the 
local bank nor its market position. Such a move may prove profitable for a parent   9 
 





2.3   Impact of the common currency on financial markets 
 
Introduction of the common currency brings several benefits for financial market. 
The most important of them is the elimination of exchange rate risk, as there are no more 
exchange rates. Lack of this risk significantly decreases the risk of investing and operating 
abroad, therefore, it stimulates internationalisation. Moreover, it reduces the costs of cross-
border transactions, as there is no asymmetry of information, no need to hedge and much 
better comparability of prices. All this considerably enhances transparency of the market. 
In addition, banks, pension funds and insurance companies as institutions of public trust, 
which must reduce risk to minimum, have imposed limits on their engagement in assets 
denominated in foreign currencies. With a single currency, these limits exist no more. As a 
result, these institutions have much more possibilities to increase their return on invested 
assets, bringing bigger profits to their customers. 
Apart from elimination of exchange rate risk, common currency contributes to the 
decrease of country-specific risk by unification of monetary policy, which means equal 
nominal interest rates in all member states. As a result, there is a common base for all 
interest rate securities, thus the market interest rate of a security depends mostly on its risk 
premium. This also strongly contributes to transparency of the market. 
However, reaping maximal benefits from the common currency by national financial 
markets is only possible if a single financial market within the whole single currency area 
exists. Only then it is possible to take advantage of the synergy effect and significantly 
improve depth and liquidity of capital markets. 
As the single financial market is not necessary for the introduction of the common 
currency, although it is strongly beneficial, the process of its creation was not concurrent 
with monetary integration in the European Union. Establishing the single financial market 
is scheduled to be completed by 2005, while the euro exists since 1999. 
                                                 
3 For more details concerning banking system in candidate states see: A. Kot, Accession countries over 
the last decade: credits to non-financial sector and the role of foreign ownership in the banking 
sector, Warsaw, January 2004.   10 
 
Accession countries will in an opposite situation. Due to their preparations for 
joining the European Union, they are currently implementing all regulations necessary for 
participation in the EU single financial market. As a result, they will jump into the final 
stages of its creation on 1
st May 2004, and will participate in its completion. Eventually, 
they will participate in the EU single financial market without sharing the common 
currency. Due to this, they will not be able to gain full benefits of this process, despite 
being very well prepared, from the regulatory as well as organisational point of view. 
 
 
2.4   Technical aspects of introducing the euro – Giovannini Report 
 
Introduction of the single currency is a very important and challenging process for 
financial markets, as it is necessary to convert all securities, as well as other assets, from 
domestic currency to euro denomination. There are several questions, for example: How to 
do it? When to do it?, and much more. Accession countries entering the EMU will face the 
same problems, as the EMU countries on the day of its creation. Therefore, it is strongly 
advisable to follow the solutions implemented by the euro pioneers.  
In the second half of the 1990s, the European Commission, as well as Member States 
preparing for the euro introduction, were very well aware of the challenges facing financial 
markets. Thus, in order to ensure smooth conversion process, a group of experts was set 
up, chaired by Alberto Giovannini. The Group, formed in 1996, was to identify 
consequences of the introduction of the common currency on financial markets and put 
forward practical solutions that would improve market integration. The solutions were 
proposed in the first of four reports which have been prepared. Its main aim was to 
identify technical solutions which have to be adopted by markets and provide guidance for 
both public authorities and markets.  
Regarding the bond market, the recommendations proposed by the Group were the 
following
4: 
•  Redenomination of existing debt, as it would increase liquidity and the credibility of 
the process by demonstrating governments’ commitment. This would also remove the 
risk of investor’s holding securities denominated in national currency and emerging 
differentials in rates. In order to deal with the problem of new nominal amount of 
                                                 
4 Impact of the introduction of the euro on capital markets, Communication from the Commission, 
Brussels, 1997, p. 2-5.   11 
 
bonds individual member states should introduce appropriate renominalisation 
measures that would have minimum influence on financial rights and obligations; 
•  "Bottom-up" technique for redenomination was proposed as an optimal method, with 
rounding to the nearest cent; the number of approaches to redenomination was also to 
be kept as low as possible; 
•  Harmonised market rules would be desirable, as they provide transparency and greater 
clarity as to the format of the future market. Actual/Actual system should be 
implemented for day counts for bond markets. On coupon frequency, the choice 
should be left open (semi – annual or annual). Introduction of standard definition for 
business days is also desirable (i.e. TARGET business days); 
•  Price continuity has to be ensured and prices may be calculated on national basis or on 
European ones, however introduction of Eurozone-wide indicator rates is desirable; 
•  Informal co-ordination of government debt issuing could prove to be beneficial, both 
for issuing institutions and buyers.  
As for the equity market, the main conclusions were the following: 
•  Exchanges will trade and quote in euro from first January 1999 and intermediaries will 
have to make the necessary conversion; 
•  Redenomination should be carried along with the same change in the accounting unit 
and its exact date should be a company’s decision; 
•  Non par value (NPV) shares solution was recommended, as it excludes need for 
physical exchange of share certificates. The share prices can be adjusted by simple 
splitting and there is no need for capital adjustment. However, the implementation of 
the NPV share solution would require national legislation to be adopted in most of the 
Member States
5. 
It is worth underlining that the importance of harmonization and implementation 
of common rules differs between bond markets and equity markets. This fact mirrors other 
phenomena, namely the direct impact of the introduction of the common currency on 
both markets. While government bond market has recorded rather qualitative increase, the 
situation on corporate bond market was substantially different. The reasons behind its 
growth were: wave of merges and acquisitions, relatively low interest rates, poorer 
performance on part of the companies and unfavourable situation on equity markets. The 
                                                 
5 Ibidem, p.3-5.   12 
 
influence of these factors was further amplified by the introduction of the euro. As for the 
equity markets, issuers tend to rather concentrate on national markets and currency of 
denomination plays only minor role. Moreover, organized markets are, by definition, 
mostly affected by macroeconomic changes and global events. The inequality of 
indispensable changes on both markets recommended by the Giovannini Group reflected 
this fact. While the immediate effect brought along with euro has strongly affected bond 
market and means of financing in Western Europe (shift towards Anglo-Saxon model to 
the detriment of intermediaries), the currency itself could not eliminate persisting 
differences between countries. Differences that have direct impact on creating truly single, 
transparent and liquid financial market.  
 
 
2.5   Financial markets in accession countries on their way to euro 
 
First of all, it must be noted that introduction of the common currency in candidate 
countries is a part of much wider and complex process and it should be treated as such. All 
Accession Countries will have to adopt euro as none of them has the privilege of opt-out, 
yet their path towards Eurozone may differ in time and applied strategies. 
Bearing in mind that euro is only a part of single financial market in Europe, 
accession countries must apply strategy that would cover the whole process of integration. 
Thus, at first it is essential to participate in the process of creating the EU single financial 
market and become a part of it, even though without euro reaping full benefits will not be 
possible.  
The remaining tasks, directly related to euro adoption, will be easier due to the 
experience of current EMU countries. In preparation for the introduction of common 
currency, accession countries should try to implement strategy that would include: 
•  close cooperation with legal and institutional authorities of the EU and Eurozone, 
namely European Central Bank (ECB), European Securities Committee (ESC), 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) and the European Commission; 
•  careful and thorough analysis of all steps taken by Member States on their way to euro, 
with special attention to fundamental reports: Giovannini reports, Lamfalussy 
Committee reports, advice of the European Commission, as well as directives and 
regulations; each state should also prepare a list of country-specific and most ailing 
problems;   13 
 
•  analysis of aftermath of the steps taken by Member States and adopted solutions 
should be done; possible drawbacks should be identified and alternative solutions 
should be elaborated;  
•  each country should prepare a list of the tasks that are to be undertaken by public 
sector and those falling on the private one; to smooth the process, cooperation of the 
two should be established as fast as possible;  
•  strategy of each country should include clear objective, sequence of indispensable 
actions, clear allocation of responsibility, appropriate deadlines and adequate methods 
of control; 
•  strategies leading to euro and adopted solutions should be adjusted to country-specific 
features and problems; 
•  national capital markets should follow the general tendencies observed in the EU, such 
as increasing consolidation and privatisation of capital market institutions; joining this 
process will ensure proper preparation for the introduction of euro, as well as 
participation in the slowly emerging pan-European capital market; abstaining from 
internationalisation may result in isolation, and eventual disappearance of national 
capital market. 
 Taking into account that financial markets in Member States are far more developed 
and integrated, as they have already walked the path that is to be followed, the task before 
accession countries is relatively easier. One must also remember that strong presence of 
foreign financial institutions on national markets may be very beneficial. While majority of 
the banking system in CEE countries is in their hands, the implementation of technology, 
know-how and appropriate practices is going to be significantly easier. Thus, the private 
sector should not impede the integration, on contrary. The potential disadvantage of 
foreign ownership is its impact on the system stability, since even correct and reliable 
domestic regulation may be insufficient in this situation. The behaviour of foreign-owned 
banks depends very much on the stability of the parent institution. Thus, this becomes a 
potential channel for spreading the financial sector instability. The effective cooperation of 
regulatory institutions becomes crucial and it should become one of the parts of applied 
strategy.  
The situation is somehow different with stock exchanges, as there is little certainty 
about their long term development. In most cases the strategy consists of increasing   14 
 
liquidity, capitalization, improving transparency and education. However, while it does 
not have to be clearly stated, consolidation with bigger European bourses is more than 
probable. It is worth underlining that possible dangers deriving from increased foreign 
involvement, already visible in the banking sector, will not affect this segment of the 
market. Even though many countries with relatively small capitalization are perhaps not 
going to pay to much attention to this segment of the market, they should take into 
consideration that alternatives to financing via the banking sector are desirable. It would 
provide them with better stability. Moreover, capital markets are more effective in 
financing innovations.  
Along with the introduction of legal acts, some institutional changes should be 
implemented, with emphasis put on supervisory bodies. It is argued that, as long as 
different regulation will exist among each segment, there will be no reasons for integrated 
supervision. Moreover, the exact shape of supervisory model should match the shape of the 
market itself. However, properly applied integrated supervision would lead to increased 
coordination and coherence of regulations and efficiency deriving from economics of scale. 
Each country should decide what type of supervision is to be implemented
6. The other 
question is supra-national supervision of financial segments all over the Europe. Taking 
into account increasing globalisation and presence of foreign investors on national markets 
such step would be desirable. Regulatory bodies of accession countries should definitely 
participate cooperation of European supervisory authorities. Moreover, the delegations and 
independence of supervisory agencies of accession countries should be enhanced, so that 
they match market and system requirements. 
 
 
2.6   Conclusions 
 
Accession countries will participate in the EU single financial market before 
introducing the common currency. This has several positive effects, among others, this will 
ensure proper preparation for joining the Eurozone, as far as institutional framework and 
legal adjustment is concerned. Therefore, the remaining tasks will have mainly technical 
character. Due to this, from financial markets point of view, the quickest possible euro 
adoption would be most advisable, as only with the single currency, accession countries 
                                                 
6 Stan przygotowań polskiego rynku kapitałowego do integracji z Unią Europejską, Komisja Papierów 
Wartościowych i Giełd, November 2002, p. 34-38.   15 
 
will be able to fully benefit from the single financial market. To some extent however, 
these benefits will be unequal among these countries. It is due to the fact, that states which 
have their national currency pegged against the euro, as in the currency board arrangement, 
do not experience exchange rate fluctuations, therefore, country specific risk is limited. 
These countries will be able to befit from the single financial market to a greater extent 
even without euro. 
For financial markets there is only one drawback of quick euro adoption. It is related 
with the risk of improper entry exchange rate, as well with the fact that the parity will not 
be generally known by the public. Market participants, aware of the fact that speculation 
on the exchange parity between euro and national currency may prove very profitable, 
may destabilise the market for a short period of time. This could have considerable 
detrimental effects. Proper preparation for joining the Eurozone, as well as stable exchange 
rate would eliminate this risk, but it may require a little more time. 
  As far as technical aspects of euro adoption is concerned, it would be strongly 
advisable that candidates learn from the experience of current EMU members. Moreover, 
some accession countries will probably join earlier, while other later. Therefore some new 
experiences of relatively young market economies introducing the common currency will 
also be available to some countries. Learning from each other and taking advantage of the 
best practices can be achieved by close cooperation between legal authorities, both 
government and independent regulatory institutions. Careful analysis of both, preparatory 
process and its implementation should guarantee the success. 
 
 
I. 3. Labour markets 
 
3.1  Introduction 
Accession to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) does not put any direct 
requirements on the labour market of candidate countries. However, sound and stable 
economic situation seems to be a necessary precondition as far as fulfilment of the criteria 
laid down by the Maastricht Treaty is concerned. Such a situation can be created only if the 
labour market is functioning properly – it is sufficiently effective and it ensures adequate 
balance between security and flexibility.    16 
 
EMU member states have not, on average, carried out more reforms than EU 
countries staying outside the Eurozone and it is difficult to find any significant link 
between the initial unemployment level in these countries and the labour market reform 
indicators. Nevertheless, reforming the labour market before the macroeconomic 
environment becomes more unfavourable, that is, before joining the monetary union, 
seems to be a good solution. Becoming a member of the EMU means that it is not possible 
to use country-specific monetary and exchange rate policies to offset asymmetric economic 
shocks, hence improving the ability of accession countries’ labour markets to adjust to such 
shocks in the future should be in their best interest.  
There are two major labour market issues relevant from the EMU membership point 
of view: unemployment and labour market flexibility. In general, bringing down the 
relatively high unemployment rate is necessary in order to avoid a shift in the political 
preferences in EMU member states from price stability to employment-creating but 
inflationary monetary policy, and greater labour market flexibility enhances the capacity of 
this market to adapt to changing economic environment. 
Unfortunately, labour markets of the EU accession countries do not seem to be as 
flexible as they should, bearing in mind the need to achieve high levels of employment in a 
near future, as well as necessary smooth adjustment to quickly changing demand and 
branch structure of the market. Therefore, any adverse shock over the labour market, as a 
result of unfavourable changes on trade flows (e.g. higher competition between imports and 
national production) or adjustments in the productive structure might have long-lasting 
effects and increase regional disparities. With limited options (or non-existence of such 
options, labour market takes up the role of the main shock absorber. This fact is a very 
important argument, stressed also in the optimal currency area theory, in favour of making 
labour markets more flexible, and thus able to cushion external shocks. 
Over the past years, EMU member states have conducted a number of reforms of 
labour market institutions. The type and scope of the reforms differed significantly across 
countries and labour market outcomes have evolved differently. This is a kind of evidence 
that the problem requires an individual approach – it is not possible to create just one, 
common labour market policy advise for all the accession countries. Moreover, while 
working on the policy advice, one should avoid making comparisons with the situation 
which occurred in present EMU member states, as measures applied there cannot be simply   17 
 
transposed to the accession countries. However, the analysis of the reforms in EMU 
countries may indicate to some extent what has to be changed on the labour market as far 
as the process of preparation for EMU membership is concerned. 
Apart from that, it must be noted that the labour market policy has only a limited 
impact on the labour market situation. In most cases, other policies have major influence 
on this market and the role of labour market policy is only to diminish the negative results 
of them.  
 
 
3.2  Labour markets before the EMU – what to do? 
While preparing to the EMU membership, the accession countries should keep in 
mind all the targets which the EMU countries are currently trying to meet, even though 
they are not directly tied with the common currency. In particular, the introduction of the 
quantitative targets for employment rates agreed by the European Council (in Lisbon, 2000 
and in Stockholm, 2001) may introduce some peer pressure on those countries that have 
less employment-friendly policies. Under the Lisbon Agenda, an overall employment target 
of 70% by 2010 was established for the European Union, to which an intermediate target of 
67% by 2005 was later added at the Stockholm Spring Council in 2001. The above target 
seems to be pretty ambitious even for the present member states, and the new member 
states may find it impossible to meet, at least in the given time perspective (in 2002, the 
average employment rate in accession countries was 55,9%, while in the euro area it 
reached the level of 64,3%).  
Spring European Council in 2003 admitted that the achievement of the Lisbon 
Strategy Goals is at risk in enlarged EU and it called up a special task force to write a report 
on the most immediate measures that should be undertaken in order to improve the 
situation on the labour market. The major proposals regarding accession countries given in 
the report and in Joint Assessment Papers are summarised in the Chart 1. (each activity 
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Hold wage developments with productivity  growth      X  X  X        
Reduce high tax wedge - built more employment tax system  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Increase the level of R&D spending  X    X  X    X    X    X 
Promote part time work and fixed term work  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Reduce  undeclared  work  X  X  X X X X X X X X 
Increase spending on Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP’s)  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Modernise and develop Public Employment Services (PES)       X    X  X    X     
Tackle  young  people  unemployment          X   X 
Increase  mobility  X  X  X X X X X X X X 
Increase  female  participation         X     
Better integration of minorities and immigrants in the labour 
market     X  X X X X       X 
Raise human capital and improve lifelong learning systems (e.g. 
facilitate access to a university degree)   X  X  X X X X X X X X 
Reduce the number of early school leavers              X  X       
Increase participation in training for the entire workforce  
X      X X     X    
 
 
The most important messages driven from the chart for the policy which should be 
run in all the accession countries are as follow:  
•  promote flexibility,  
•  reduce high tax wedge, 
•  increase spending on active labour market policies, 
•  invest in human capital and improve lifelong learning, 
•  increase mobility, 
•  reduce undeclared work. 
Improved job mediation, more flexible wages and increased wage differentiation, 
improved education, training and life-long learning, reforms of tax and benefit systems, less 
restrictive employment protection regulation, working-time flexibility as well as measures 
to increase labour mobility all contribute to increasing labour market flexibility
7. The 
more decentralised is the wage setting process, the lower the lay-off protection, the lower 
the unemployment benefits, the more open the social dialogue and the less directly 
                                                 
7  Labour market mismatches in Euro Area Countries, European Central Bank, March 2002, 
http//:www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/labourmarket2002.pdf.   19 
 
intervening active labour market policy, the bigger is this flexibility
8. In other words, 
labour market flexibility requires a shift towards a model of employment that is less rigid 
and enhances the capacity of the labour market to adapt to any occurring changes. 
It is desirable that the potential EMU member states should reduce tax wedge. 
However, this is not so easy to accomplish, as budgetary expenses tend to increase rather 
than decrease throughout the history in most of these countries. Hence, they should do 
their best at least not to generate additional budgetary burdens. New policies which are to 
be introduced should be financed through existing budgetary resources, as budgetary shifts 
are still possible. Only the resources destined to co-finance Structural Funds should be 
considered as expenses that can be created additionally, even by increasing budget deficit or 
public debt. Otherwise, additional budgetary expenses would bring more disadvantages 
than advantages. Moreover, it should be noted that excessive budgetary burdens directly 
endanger fulfilment of the convergence criteria, and consequently jeopardize rapid 
accession of a country to the EMU.  
It is also important to introduce active labour market policies subsidising low-paid 
employment in order to increase the effective labour supply of low-skilled workers. In 
general, however, such measures are second-best to necessary reforms of tax and benefit 
systems. These systems affect the labour markets from the supply side to the extent that 
they influence both search intensity and incentives to invest in human capital. In 
particular, in the absence of strict job search requirements, generous unemployment 
benefits may lead to an insufficient job search intensity, and long benefit durations may 
tend to increase long-term unemployment. Moreover, generous unemployment benefits 
can adversely affect matching processes in the event of cyclical downswings, as workers 
who become unemployed have weaker incentives to take up work when real wages 
decrease.  
The next crucial issue for the accession countries to focus on, while preparing for 
EMU membership, concerns wage-setting systems and the related degree of centralization 
of wage bargaining, which affect labour markets through their impact on the structure and 
the level of wages. While analysing the occupational mismatches in some euro area 
countries, it is possible to notice that insufficiently differentiated occupational or sectoral 
                                                 
8 A. Freytag, Estonian Labour Market and EMU Membership – Challenges and Policy Options,     
http://www.eestipank.info/pub/en/dokumendid/publikatsioonid/seeriad/uuringud/_11_2002/in
dex.en.pdf.   20 
 
wage structures hinder mobility between occupations and sectors. Furthermore, the 
educational mismatches indicate that an inadequate dispersion of the educational wage 
structure reduces incentives to invest in human capital. Apart from that, an insufficient 
dispersion of regional wage structures limits the firms’ incentives to relocate their 
production to regions with high unemployment, thereby contributing to the persistence of 
regional labour market mismatches as well as insufficient regional labour force mobility. 
One more factor contributing to labour force mobility is education policy, in 
particular, concerning the quality of schooling and vocational training. Education and 
training systems prepare the workforce for changing demands – the better educated the 
labour force, the higher its potential mobility. Improved education, training and life-long 
learning contribute to the level of employment, reduce the number of educational and 
occupational mismatches, and thus they are considered to be important for the future 
development of the labour market. Lifelong learning is especially important in the 
contemporarily quickly changing economic environment and very fast technological 
progress, which requires constant adjustment of employees to volatile market needs. Due 
to this, improvements in education and training systems should be high on the political 
agenda in the accession countries. 
The next issue that can influence labour market flexibility is employment protection 
regulation. In the presence of strict employment protection regulation, employers tend to 
fill vacancies only with well-matching employees, as dismissals tend to be costly. This may 
lead to a substantial reduction of occupational mobility. High firing costs for firms tend to 
reduce the number of hires during upswings, because employers will be more reluctant to 
hire if dismissal costs are high. At the same time, they tend to reduce firings during 
downturns. Consequently, as a result of reduced inflows into unemployment, strict 
employment protection regulation tends to reduce short-term unemployment. Owing to a 
smaller outflow, however, it tends to increase long-term unemployment. Running such a 
policy may cause that the labour market will not be able to adjust to cyclical and structural 
changes, and thus it may affect negatively productivity.  
While analysing the problems of the labour market adjustments, it is also important 
to remember about working time flexibility. Working time accounts as well as the 
possibility of shifting between full-time and part-time jobs allow firms to adjust the level of 
employment more flexibly in response to changes in production and employees to adjust   21 
 
working time in  line with their private needs. Hence, increased working time flexibility 
might contribute to a better adaptation of labour supply to changing demand, thereby 
improving the functioning of the labour market in general.  
It is also crucial for the accession countries to increase effectiveness of employment 
services, as they can enhance the efficiency of labour market matching processes through 
better channelling of information about job vacancies to the unemployed and better 
mediation between unemployed persons and vacancies (employment agencies seem to be 
particularly important institutions in this process – their role in improving job mediation 
in the euro area countries has been notable). Apart from that, more intensive job search 
assistance not only can improve the situation on the labour market, but also it is said to be 
cost-effective. 
Moreover, it can be very useful to developed and strengthen the social dialogue, that 
is, to settle disputes between trade unions and employers on principle issues. This can be 
used to develop strategies regarding training and education, not mentioning its importance 
as far as problems of discrimination or marginalisation are concerned. In addition to the 
social dialogue, it seems necessary to support the development of entrepreneurship and 
enterprises.  
Additionally, trade unions have a new role to play in the process of labour market 
adjustments leading to greater elasticity. Flexible labour markets limit the number of 
unemployed due to possibility to reduce costs of labour. This enables to employ more 
people with the same amount of money. Trade unions must understand this in order 
accept labour market reforms. They can then convince their members that the 
implemented measured are, in longer run, beneficial for the whole labour force. 
Finally, the accession countries should remember that the situation on the labour 
market can be improved by effective absorption of structural funds, mainly European 
Social Fund. Current prognoses show that full absorption of Structural Funds is rather 
unlikely. Hence, the accession countries should do their best in order to increase their 
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3.3  Conclusions 
Labour markets in all accession countries are different due to their specific industry 
structure, current economic situation, and their recent history. Unemployment rate varies 
between a little more than 5% (Hungary, Slovenia) and up to almost 20% (Poland, 
Slovakia). Due to this no integrated approach to labour market policy is possible. Each 
accession country has to develop workable policies that reflect their particular 
circumstances and tackle country-specific problems. Naturally, experience of current EU 
member states is valuable as source of ideas and ready-made solutions, due to considerable 
successes in fighting unemployment, promoting job creation and providing vocational 
training. These solutions, however, must be adjusted to suit individual accession countries.   
It is also important to stress, that the EMU accession does not explicitly require 
labour market reforms. Nevertheless, flexible and effective labour markets are necessary to 
increase fully benefit from euro adoption, and to increase stability of the economy in the 
situation of a very limited number of other shock absorbers. The path of structural reforms 
is certainly not easy to take, especially for political reasons, as it is socially unpopular, but 




I. 4. Foreign Direct Investments 
 
4.1   Introduction 
Foreign direct investments (FDI) play an important role in the process of economic 
development of EU accession countries. They enhance the export performance of these 
countries’ economies, stimulate job creation and constitute a crucial source of capital, 
technology and management techniques. Because of that, the incentives which can attract 
FDI inflows are currently high on the political agenda in most of these countries.  
During the last decade, world FDI inflows have risen form just over US $200 billion 
to around $1 250 billion in 2000.
9 This rapid growth took place mainly due to increased 
liberalisation brought about by reduced barriers to trade and investment. It was also 
                                                 
9 UNCTAD World Investment Reports, (1991-2003), UN, New York.   23 
 
influenced by the fact that the benefits of FDI were finally recognised and appreciated, 
which made many countries focus on improving their investment climates. The 1990s. 
appeared to be a perfect time for the accession countries, which were dealing with the 
process of transformation of their economies, to benefit from the inflow of FDI as well. 
Since the beginning of transformation, FDI inflows in Central and Eastern Europe have 
kept growing. Much of this increase has been attracted by liberalisation, privatisation, 
macrostabilisation, relatively favourable investment climates (e.g. well educated and 
relatively cheap labour force), by prospects of accession to the EU and by expectations of 
increases in productivity while the economy develops and restructures. In general, progress 
in transition has been considered to be the most important factor attracting FDI in this 
region, because even a great economic potential of a given country could not help much if 
the country showed a lack of will or ability to unlock this potential through market-
oriented reforms.   
 
4.2  FDI and pursuit towards common currency 
In the 1990s, liberalism became a leading ideology in Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEEC) that for many years had been in the grip of the communist regime. 
Generally, liberalisation has a decisive meaning for macrostabilisation policy, 
macrostability and non discriminatory treatment of foreign investors are put in first place, 
as far as attracting FDI inflows is concerned. Capital will not come to an economy where 
inflation is not under control, hence permanent elimination of the sources of inflation is a 
necessity. Investments will not be also attracted by an economy which does not liberalise 
relations with international surrounding, introducing international norms in this respect. 
A country which wants to attract FDI should be able to exercise corporate governance 
without arbitrary bureaucratic interference as well as transparent and fair regulatory and 
legal environment. Otherwise, there are fears that privatisation is a transitional stage, 
which in short will be replaced by nationalization of production potential, sold previously 
to foreign investors. Such fears seem probable in undemocratic conditions, when a 
government changes most of the decisions of the former one, just to gain support of the 
population by giving new privileges and abolishing old ones.
 10 
                                                 
10 K. Żukrowska, Euro and capital flows: the single currency and external economic relations of the EU, 
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Apart from that, an investment climate should include effective markets, sound 
financial institutions and developed infrastructure. Only if all the above preconditions are 
fulfilled, it makes sense to attract FDI inflows by active policy measures, e.g. tax policy 
regulations, higher interest rates and – in case of EU accession countries – the degree of 
harmonisation of a given country’s law with acquis communautaire.   
Higher interest rates constitute a good solution for all catching-up and transforming 
countries, as they reduce possibilities to draw bad credits (dangerous both for a banking 
system and for enterprises) and force to increase productivity by utilisation of simple 
labour reserves; such reserves are available in all post-communist countries, as they were 
experiencing full employment (that is, over-employment).
11  
In general, credits for investments are drawn in economies with low level of interest 
rates and invested in economies where the level of interest rates is high. This mechanism 
multiplies returns simply by a move of capital from one economy to the other, and the 
final profit coming out of it depends on differences in development between the economies 
concerned, that is, the bigger the differences, the higher the profit. In case of an economy 
with high level of interest rates, there is an inflow of investments which causes direct 
effects as far as stimulating of this country’s economic growth is concerned. On the other 
hand, however, the economy with low level of interest rates, which exports the capital, is 
stimulated as well. But in the second case, the effect is achieved with delay, as exported 
capital stimulates the economy of the country of origin indirectly. It is important to stress 
here the fact that smaller amounts of capital are needed to stimulate an economy by 
exporting capital and waiting for indirect effect than it would be the case if the capital was 
invested directly on domestic market. This is achieved by effect of differences in purchasing 
power parity (PPP) of developed and catching-up economies.
12  
Countries close to EU accession are using different strategies as far as the level of 
their interest rates is concerned. Some of them keep reducing the rates, bringing them 
closer to the level of the interest rate in the EMU, while others keep this rate, on purpose, 
higher than the EMU one. The best example of these differentiated strategies can be given 
by Poland or Hungary and the Czech Republic. The interest rate in the Czech Republic 
                                                 
11 K. Żukrowska,  Level of interest rate and capital flows, in: K. Żukrowska, D. Sobczak (ed.), 
Eastward  Enlargement of the Eurozone. Impact on Trade, FDI and Capital Markets, The Knowledge 
Institute, Warsaw 2003, p. 131. 
12 K. Żukrowska, Euro and capital flows..., op. cit.   25 
 
were reduced to EMU level, which stimulated the consumption on both state’s and 
households level. Hungary – following the pattern of changes that was applied in Czech 
Republic –lowered their interest rate as well. Afterwards, however, they had to return to 
the old level of interest rate, an further even increase it.
13 The low level of the Czech 
interest rate resulted in an increase in imports and stimulated pressure on inflation. In case 
of Hungary, similar symptoms were noticed, but as they were perceived as unfavourable 
by the country’s central bank, the bank decided to withdraw from its previous decisions 
and increase the exchange rate again. In case of Poland, the exchange rate is being gradually 
reduced, planning to come closer to the level represented by the EMU. However, it will 
probably stop at a certain point, that is, at a level higher than the one of the EMU, just not 
to loose the simulative effect on foreign investments. 
In general, low exchange rate can be applied without loosing position in attracting 
foreign investors when other factors increasing competitiveness of the market are 
introduced. In case of the Czech Republic, the role of such a factor played the decision to 
lower taxes meaningfully.  
Until joining the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 2 (ERM2), the accession 
countries can also enjoy the possibility to attract FDI by the level of their exchange rate. 
After becoming EU members, economies of these countries will be still attractive for FDI 
flows within the internal market, as they will be expected to increase productivity faster 
than old member states, and their markets will be still less satiated. However, most 
national currencies in the countries which are characterised by advanced transformation 
process indicate a tendency to appreciate (so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect), which 
encourages investing. At the beginning of transformation there was just an opposite trend – 
currencies of these countries went under a pressure of devaluation. Such a situation led to 
increased competitiveness of exports, decreased competitiveness of imports, and it 
stimulated FDI inflows when economies were still in protectionist phase. With 
liberalisation of trade and capital flows, appreciation was stimulating inflows. The type of 
conducted exchange rate policy matters in case of small economies and not big ones, which 
are able to absorb increased production. In small economies additional production is 
mainly sold on foreign markets, thus the level of exchange rate is crucial in calculating 
profitability. Currently, size of the markets and geographical trends in liberalisation allow 
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to say that differences in exchange rate values matter in pointing out directions of the flow 
of capital and goods. Due to this, keeping higher interest rates can be, in certain conditions, 
advantageous for a country. 
Monetary union membership will limit the number of possibilities of attracting FDI, 
as new EMU members will not be able to use national exchange rates and interest rates any 
more. During two years of stabilizing exchange rate in ERM-2, EU members will have the 
possibility to influence the level of their exchange rates by changing the level of interest 
rate. While doing so, however, the countries will aim to keep the parity within the band of 




4.3  Taxes and inflow of FDI 
The next factor which plays an important role in attracting FDI constitute taxes. 
Countries can stimulate their economy both by lowering personal income tax (PIT) and 
corporate income tax (CIT). The stimulation brings better effects in case of lowering the 
level of PIT, as it means that more money are left in disposal of the consumers. While 
aiming at attracting foreign capital flows, however, reduction of the level of CIT is of 
crucial importance. For example, in Ireland low corporate taxes – through the stimulation 
of an inflow of foreign direct investments – made the country reach the highest rate of 
growth in the EU. 
As far as the accession countries are concerned, various kinds of tax breaks and 
reductions are used. Such measures have been applied by the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Latvia, Poland and the Slovak Republic. In the Czech Republic, for example, tax breaks of 
up to ten years are offered to all firms that make a US $10 million investment in 
manufacturing through a newly registered company or US $5 million investment in 
regions with the unemployment rate at least 25 per cent higher than the national average; 
and in Hungary: (1) corporate tax credit of 50 per cent is offered for an investment in the 
hotel industry provided that the investment is not less than HUF 1 billion, or that the 
investment is permanently made in a high-priority region or in an economic zone; (2) a 
company is eligible for a ten-year tax holiday if it invests at least HUF 3 billion in the 
manufacturing sector in an underdeveloped region, or if it hires at least 100 additional   27 
 
employees by the second year following the completion of its project and maintains the 
employment until the end of the tax holiday, or if the sales revenue of the company 
increases by an annual average of 5 per cent of the investment value; (3) there is a 100 per 
cent corporate tax allowance for a period of ten years for all investments exceeding  US 
$35,4 million, or US $0,6 million for investments in underdeveloped areas.  
Although lowering the level of CIT constitutes a good incentive to attract FDI 
inflows, it would be reasonable for EU member states – and particularly for EMU member 
states –  to harmonise their taxes. Otherwise, there is a danger that the existence of a 
possibility to lower taxes will lead to tax competition. When such a tendency occurs within 
a group of countries, which form internal market and have a common currency, then 
disintegrating tendencies will arise and increase tensions among the members of the 
integrated group.
14 Moreover, competition in this field results in allocation of capital in a 
manner which is not necessarily most effective.
15 A coordination of taxes or an 
introduction of a double level system (one bringing revenues to national budget and the 
other one to the central budget of the EU) could constitute a solution to this problem; if 
countries do not come to an agreement on common tax levels, than it would be necessary 
to introduce a flat tax equal for companies and individuals.
16 
Across the region of Central and Eastern Europe, privatisation policies have been a 
significant factor determining trends and fluctuations in FDI inflows so far. Where strategic 
sales have been an important component of privatisation relative to the use of vouchers, 




4.4  Conclusions 
There is no doubt that the accession countries, while following the path of 
liberalisation and privatisation, have been successfully catching up with the rest of the 
world in the field of FDI. However, both the process of liberalisation and privatisation will 
                                                 
14 K. Żurowska, Fiscal policy in Poland after 1989 – background for growth stimulation in transforming 
and EU economies. Practise and some generalisations, in: K. Żukrowska, D. Sobczak (ed.), Strategy of 
EMU enlargement. Background, optimal choices, consequences., The Knowledge Institute, Warsaw 
2004, p. 93-130. 
15 T. E. Olsen, P. Osmundsen, Spillovers and international competition for investments, Journal of 
International Economics 59, 2003, p. 211-238. 
16 Ibidem. 
17 Transition report, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2000, p. 83-84.   28 
 
be completed soon and the countries will need new incentives in order to attract foreign 
investments. It seems that a crucial issue of the post-privatisation era will be how to attract 
FDI into greenfield ventures and into privately owned assets. While the attractiveness of 
existing industrial and commercial assets will depend on their valuation in secondary 
markets, foreign investors who consider greenfield investments need to take into account 
the cost of new plant and equipment, the business environment and market potential; they 
should find particularly important the security provided to investors by the existence of 
enforceable contracts, standardised product classification and business practices as well as 
all the regulations which are applied while commercial transactions are concluded.
18  
Fortunately, the experience of the transition economies and other emerging markets 
shows that FDI tend to be closely linked to rising bilateral trade flows. Hence, integration 
into the European Union which means a removal of barriers to market entry, legal 
harmonisation and fall of borders control should increase bilateral trade between new and 
old EU members and thus stimulate new FDI inflows. 
In addition, a country can stimulate its competitive advantages, and thus capital 
inflows, by developing infrastructure, as well as deregulating postal and public services. 
This phenomenon was discovered by economists. As a result, it was reflected in GATS 
regulations which formed common framework on global level.
19 Nevertheless practices in 
individual countries tend to neglect this fact until now. 
 
 
I. 5. Conclusions 
 
Analysis of the three different segments of real economy provides several interesting 
conclusions. Firstly, it seems clear that in order to fully benefit from the monetary 
integration, there must be a certain degree of convergence of real spheres of the economy, 
especially due to the fact that some stabilising instruments of national authorities will be 
integrated on the EMU-wide scale. This fact greatly limits differentiation between 
countries in conducting their own policy, independent from the other member states. 
                                                 
18 Ibidem, p. 84. 
19 S. Sinclair, Grieshaber, Return to sender: the impact of GATS “pro competitive regulation” on postal 
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The current EMU member states have already prepared their economies for the 
common currency. They have therefore a lot of their own experiences, both positive and 
negative, which considerably differ among countries. Due to this, Accession Countries 
should learn from the current EMU members, identifying the best solutions and fitting 
them to their own specific problems and characteristics.  
Taking up the discussion on the most appropriate time for entering the EMU, it must 
also be kept in mind, that the situation looks very much differently from the point of view 
of different spheres. Taking into account financial markets, the common currency should 
be adopted as quickly as possible, as Accession Countries will fully participate in 
integration of these markets, therefore lack of euro will significantly limit possible benefits 
and development of this segment. Quite similar conclusion can be drawn for development 
of FDI, as elimination of exchange rate risk, which is the result of single currency, 
significantly enhances inflow of FDI. However, labour markets are in different situation. 
In some countries there is large unemployment, national labour markets in Accession 
Countries are inflexible, as well as imbalanced. There is also a considerable mismatch 
between the qualifications of the supply and the demand for labour. In effect, labour 
markets need deep, often revolutionary reforms, which are often socially unpopular. 
Introducing them requires time and should be completed before EMU accession. 
To conclude, it is also very important that the Accession Countries constantly 
monitor changes in the EMU and participate in various developments, such as the creation 
of single financial market or pursuing the goals of the Lisbon Strategy. Doing so, they will 
ensure progressing convergence, as well as remaining in the core of integration process, 
thus preparing better for adopting the euro. 
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II. Policy Advice: Policies 
Renzo Orsi et. al.  
 
II. 1. Introduction 
 
In May 2004 eight central European countries are to join the European Union. The 
EU rewards the remarkable progress Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovenia and Slovak Republic have made since the collapse of communist central 
planning. These countries are in the advanced stage of transition to market economies and 
democracy. 
These Central and East European Countries (CEECs) have undergone significant 
and successful economic and political reforms. Their growth rates have outstripped those 
of the 15 countries making up the EU today. However the accession countries still lag far 
behind western Europe. They have a lot of catching up to do in establishing market 
economies and improving infrastructure, competitiveness and living standards. So the 
transition process will continue well past the accession date.  
In the early stage of integration into the EU – what is sometimes termed nominal 
convergence – the accession countries will fulfil the conditions of joining the union. The 
second and much longer stage is real convergence which means achieving the standard of 
living in existing EU countries.  
For nominal convergence on the economic level, much of the change expected in 
the new EU members will hinge on the requirement that they adopt the euro as their 
national currency. Joining the Eurozone will eliminate exchange rate risks, reduce the long 
term cost of capital and magnify the benefits of being part of a common market. The 
accession countries are already making preparations for European Monetary Union 
membership. These include fiscal and monetary discipline, and several are already pegging 
their currencies to the euro. The timing of adoption of the euro will depend on the 
conditions prevalent in each country (see Iacone and Orsi, 2003).  
Real convergence will take much longer. The gap in per capita Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) between the accession countries and the current EU average is still large. In   31 
 
1980 the EU had nine members. The three next members, Greece, Spain and Portugal had 
a per capita income 65% of the level of the nine when they joined. If we do the same 
calculation for the current 15 and for the 10 candidates, the figure lower, i.e. it is about 
45%. The process of catching up will therefore be even more crucial in the years to come 
than it was for the southern enlargement. Even if annual growth were to average five to six 
per cent in the accession countries, it would take them about 20-30 years to reach just 75 
per cent of EU15 income levels. Such high growth is unlikely: it would be more than 
double the EU15 average and higher than that sustained by previous accession countries in 
the past decade. 
As the CEECs economies begin to mirror those of the existing EU states, inevitably 
the accession countries will experience a painful reduction in their agricultural and 
industrial sectors. The EU institutions will continue to work with these countries to 
mitigate the social consequences of transition.  
The CEECs entering in the EU need investments in both public and private sectors, 
to sustain the growth and improve living standards that will define real convergence. The 
EU will provide its new members with significant resources to bring their infrastructure 
closer to EU15 standards but this will not be enough for real convergence. And tight 
budgetary controls imposed by EU membership will make it difficult for the governments 
to fund this expansion themselves.  
Hence the need for direct investments to fund infrastructures, skills training, and 
private sector initiatives, and to advise on policy and regulatory change and 
implementation, all to underpin sustainable economic expansion. High levels of investment 
in CEECs in recent years have been directed at improving capital stock; the CEECs are 
also in need of funding for environmental and social infrastructures that will be part and 
parcel of improved living standards. From the financial side it is important to continue to 
help the development of the accession countries’ financial sectors to encourage a wider 
mobilisation of savings and more efficient allocation of these savings through private sector 
investments. It must be noticed that at present only 20 per cent of investments in these 
countries is from internally-generated private savings, compared with over 100 per cent in 
the EU15. The properly functioning financial sector would, for example, support 
development and growth of middle-sized companies, and it is well known, according to the   32 
 
experience of the actual EU15 members, that a lack of finance for small and medium sized 
enterprises stifles their development. 
The policy advices will be considered in the next sections separately for the Foreign 
Direct Investments, the Labour Market and the Social Dimension, and will be presented by 




II. 2. Exchange Rate 
(R. Orsi and F. Iacone, Bologna) 
 
There is a general consensus on the idea that the EMU enlargement should take 
place as soon as possible: the real issue is to define when the possibility arises. Most of the 
academic contributions to the discussion suggest that the EMU enlargement should take 
place as the same time as the EU enlargement. Even without neglecting the adverse 
consequences of the BS effect, it is commonly argued that waiting for a closer convergence 
of the real variables could simply take too long, surely more than the two or three years 
that the mechanism of ERM2 would impose. As the President of the Commission stated
20, 
“enlargement is not just about economics. It is important primarily for political and ethical 
reasons”, and there is the risk that the people in the CEECs could perceive an enlargement 
without EMU as incomplete.   
EMU accession then should be considered as soon as possible, as long as the 
conditions that guarantee stability of the country in the euro area are ensured. With this 
respect at least a sound fiscal consolidation and some flexibility of the labour market are 
necessary. While in the past the CEECs were all eager to join the euro-area as soon as 
possible, a more gradual approach is now emerging, possibly also because these factors are 
taken into account. 
Defining the parity towards the euro and the future conversion rates is a delicate 
task, because any adjustment of a potential misalignment must fall on the real sector, and, 
given the limited flexibility of the supply side on both the EU and the CEECS, this may 
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take some time. The CEECs begun the transition with under-valuated currencies, and 
experienced a real appreciation during the years even after correcting for productivity 
gains. The consensus in the literature seems to be that Hungary and Slovenia are quite close 
to the equilibrium, while the Czech Republic over-evaluated the currency before the 1997 
crisis, and, after a short period of under-evaluation after the crisis, is back to over-
evaluation; Slovakia too has an over-evaluated currency, but less than the Czech Republic. 
The results in the literature are anyway rather dispersed, different studies reaching opposite 
conclusions for the same country over the same period. Evidence that Poland and the 
Baltic States are over-evaluated is even more controversial.  
The countries that decided to postpone the two years phase of evaluation of the 
Maastricht criteria must choose a monetary strategy for the intermediate period. The 
opportunity of the fixed exchange rate approach was extensively debated in the last few 
years. We think that fixed exchange rate commitments cannot be managed for an indefinite 
time without capital controls, and indeed the failure of several of these arrangements had 
been a relevant source of instability on the international financial markets in the last few 
years. Narrow bands in general could make the defence of the exchange rate more difficult 
and then increase the risk of a speculative attack: notice here that the arrangement chosen 
by the current ERM2 participants, with the 15% oscillation bands per side, seems to 
acknowledge that. Since the supply of international reserves is limited, even a currency 
board is not a fully credible exchange rate agreement and can be subject to a speculative 
attack or exchange rate pressures (as it already happened in Estonia) or bank runs.  Factors 
reducing the risk of attacks are the availability of foreign currency reserves to defend a 
fixed exchange rate, along with the consistency of macro economic policies. Sustainable 
public finance represents a fundamental requirement with this regard. Another important 
support to a fixed exchange policy in a context of capital mobility is the endorsement of 
the central bank of the anchor currency: speculative attacks are often triggered by the fact 
that the reserves that a central bank can mobilise to defend the exchange rate are limited, 
and very little when compared to the volume of funds that can be risen on the market. If 
anyway the monetary authority of the anchor currency is credibly oriented to support the 
exchange rate agreement, the chance of a success of a speculative attack are much reduced, 
to the point that the expected gain in such a case can even be negative.    34 
 
Floating the exchange rate without formal commitment does not mean neglecting it 
as a policy instrument and as a potential source of disinflation: on the contrary we think 
that its effect on inflation is faster it is more reliable than the interest rate. We then expect 
the monetary authorities to use it in conjunction with the interest rate to achieve the 
target. 
Since there is enough evidence that inflation targeting provided in Poland and in the 
Czech Republic a valid reference for monetary policy and an anchor to the expectations 
not inferior to the exchange rate commitment, we think that these two countries should 
maintain the current monetary arrangement. We think that Slovakia too should introduce 
this policy regime in the explicit form in order to help the formation of expectations in 
line with the inflation stabilisation programme: if the weight of the administrate prices is 
too large, an alternative, “net”, target can be considered instead
21.  
We also think that Hungary may drop the exchange rate commitment and remain 
with the inflation target only, especially if a situation of potential conflict between the two 
monetary regimes is feared.  Failing that, we think the widest possible bands should be 
chosen and the occasional devaluations to follow the macroeconomic fundamentals should 
not be opposed; if Poland, Slovakia or Czech Republic join the ERM 2 before the 
monitoring period defined by the Maastricht criterion, we suggest them the same policy.  
In any case we think that the situation of the currencies joining the ERM 2 in the 
process of accession to the euro area may be eased because it is well known that the fixed 
exchange rate arrangement has to remain in place for only a relatively short time, and 
because it can count on some sort of support from the target currency (the euro) at least 
under some conditions.  
We already noticed that Slovenia should explicitly introduce a target for monetary 
policy to help the formation of expectations favourable to the final disinflation to the euro 
area level: with this respect the detailed plan described in the accession programme, 
subscribed both by the central bank and by the government may serve to that purpose too.  
Finally, Estonia and Lithuania plan to join the euro as soon as possible, thus having 
to enter the ERM 2 with the hard peg immediately. Latvia is planning a slower approach, 
                                                 
21 A certain feedback may still take place from the administrated to the marketed prices, making 
inflation targeting more difficult: this could justify the adoption of a relatively larger fluctuation 
band. The central bank could even allow for a “scenario dependent” target, in which the final 
reference is defined as a function of the administrated prices.   35 
 
converting the peg from the SRD to the euro only in 2005, upon accession to the ERM 2, 
and introducing narrow fluctuation bands. The Baltic States could conceivably try and 
exploit the credibility acquired so far and enter the ERM 2 with the hard peg, but 
remembering that their goal is not the hard peg itself but the euro accession, and that this 
purpose is also served by a wide oscillation band or even a free float before the evaluation 
period, so they can consider resorting to that in the wake of a speculative attack rather than 
waiting for it and opposing it putting at risk the internal stability.  
 
 
II. 3. Foreign Direct Investments  
( Jose Caetano, Evora) 
 
The expansion and adjustment of FDI flows are expected to have a positive effect on 
economic growth. However, the impact will differ across regions and sectors, both in the 
new and in current EU members. Several studies agree that border regions will be 
potentially more affected by enlargement, stressing out that the direct economic effects on 
the EU-15 will be mostly concentrated in Germany and Austria. Other regions, in less 
developed member states, such as the Cohesion countries, will face indirect effects arising 
from increasing competition, difficulties in attracting FDI and in preventing its diversion 
to the East, and from possible adjustments of structural funds. From the new members’ 
perspective, challenges go beyond dealing with the competition pressures of an enlarged 
single market. Unfinished structural reforms and the need to comply with the acquis 
communautaire may generate additional problems. Besides considering particular regions, 
countries or groups of countries, one should also focus on the European Union’s 
perspective as a whole and consider the possible negative impacts on cohesion. 
Overall, some fundamental questions remain. First, it is necessary to prevent 
harmful effects from enlargement. For example, how to sustain past convergence trends of 
the new member states and what kind of policies would make them sustainable, or how to 
achieve income convergence between old and new members and strengthen cohesion. 
Second, it is necessary to correct possible negative impacts: to lessen adverse effects from 
FDI reallocation or from the increasing probability of asymmetric shocks. Besides, an 
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capacity capable of matching “the conditions of efficiency and legal certainty prevailing in 
the EU” (European Commission, 2003). In the new members, the enforcement of 
intellectual and industrial property rights and the effective application of competition rules 
and environmental legislation are still incomplete. Visible efforts should also be made to 
control corruption.  
The European Union as well as the national authorities, have to assure the effective 
implementation and enforcement of the acquis and this will require a massive monitoring 
effort. An interesting point of view on this respect relates to the frequent dependency 
between the effective implementation of EU policy and the disposition of national and 
regional authorities to combine EU priorities with their own specific interests. The 
promotion of EU as a “facilitator” which employs “not only sticks but also carrots, 
including through the EU budget” (Sapir et al. 2003) seems adequate. Nevertheless, it is also 
prone to criticism, especially on the part of those who are not net receivers or that are 
against subsidising, unless other instruments, apart from the EU budget, are considered. 
The possibility of FDI diversion should not be excluded. Even though results from 
previous work do not fully support this scenario (Caetano et al., 2002 and Boeri and 
Brücker, 2001), specific sectors and regions may be affected. Among these are the border 
regions in Germany and Austria, but also some regions in cohesion countries, highly 
dependent on the performance of specific sectors, which are likely to be affected by FDI 
reallocation processes (textiles, for example). In addition to the usual determinants of FDI, 
as labour costs or market potential, the desire to move closer to the Central European 
market may give rise to important FDI reorientations. The difference between unit labour 
costs in the new member states and in the EU is likely to become narrower, which may 
reduce CEEC attractiveness in this respect. Furthermore, due to the presumed increase in 
labour costs after enlargement, the new and old member states face the competition from 
the other CEEC who will try to attract efficiency-seeking FDI, looking for lower cost 
locations in the new ‘frontier countries’.  
On the other hand, potential market is expected to increase due to the probable 
growth in the new members’ GDP and the consequent reduction in the economic distance 
between the EU and these countries. One should note, however, that market-seeking FDI 
flows depend essentially on the speed of income convergence, which may vary within the 
new EU members. Furthermore, not only adjustments are likely to occur in the FDI   37 
 
destination regions but also in the type of FDI involved, since the catching-up process will 
probably cause an increase in investments by horizontal multinationals and depress 
investments by vertical multinationals (Carstensen and Toubal, 2003).  
Under these circumstances, there is a need for specific policies to attract FDI, not 
only in the new member states, but also in the more vulnerable incumbent members, 
which are likely to suffer idiosyncratic shocks. Efforts should be made to implement 
structural reforms capable of generating the necessary conditions to attract market-seeking 
FDI and upgrade the demand for efficiency-seeking projects. In the particular case of the 
CEEC, having to comply FDI regimes with EU regulations, and therefore to give up some 
existent special incentives to attract FDI, several CEEC might improve international 
competitiveness by lowering corporate taxes below the EU average (UNCTAD, 2003). 
CEEC national policies should be conceived to explore positive externalities 
produced by FDI flows, namely in productivity, employment, technology transfers and 
human capital development. On the one hand, negotiations with social partners will be 
essential to achieve a sustainable development. On the other hand, current technology gaps 
have to be identified. If such gaps are very pronounced, the technology transfer process 
between local and multinational companies will be compromised and situations of 
oligopoly, or even monopoly, may take place. Besides, space for further restructuring of 
domestic firms subsists, despite the structural changes promoted by FDI, and there is a 
need for policy makers to foster the development of local innovative firms’ clusters, or 
other forms of creating synergies. Investment in R&D driven activities and in innovation 
arise as two crucial areas in order to attract FDI with high technological content. 
Additionally, there is the need to address the deepening of the financial system and to 
promote mechanisms of financial intermediation. Flexible and quick ways to find funds for 
entrepreneurial activities and easily available risk capital are important for the 
strengthening of the entrepreneurial environment and, therefore, reforms towards the 
liberalisation of the financial system should not be neglected. 
The viability of certain firms in the new member states may also be affected by the 
requirement of complying with the acquis communautaire, given the substantial investment 
efforts required. CEEC must harmonize their regimes with the EU regulations, to 
guarantee full access to the Single Market and to increase competitiveness, but also to 
benefit the most in terms of investment promotion, from the EU regional development   38 
 
funds. Financing the transposition of the acquis is exactly one of the areas identified by the 
European Commission (2003) where specific policies will have to be introduced after 
enlargement.  
Bearing in mind national specificities, the increasing heterogeneity deriving from 
enlargement and the rising number of legitimate national public policy objectives, a logical 
consequence will be the constraining of the future level of integration in the EU. The 
diversity issue has to be fully addressed for a number reasons. In order to achieve the EU 
goals of economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion, several 
issues will have to be dealt with, such as the need to increase employment rates, to upgrade 
labour force skills, to introduce higher flexibility in the labour market and to ensure that 
inter-sector mobility of the labour force will not result in increased regional disparities. 
The Structural and Cohesion funds will probably be the most suitable instruments to deal 
with the social and regional consequences of enlargement. However, although structural 
funds will play an important role in strengthening cohesion, national and regional specific 
policies have also to be undertaken. National policies should take into account possible 
asymmetric effects and, therefore, national governments could encourage territorial-based 
policies and regional networks. 
Finally, the future integration into the European Monetary Union (EMU) will 
bring additional challenges for new members states, in terms of economic growth, 
employment and FDI flows. The difficulties that some members are facing in order to 
comply with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) are a warning signal of what may be 
ahead for new members. The choice between an immediate accession to EMU and the 
establishment of a transition period is controversial. However, if accession to EMU is 
immediate, EU and national policies should take that into account. Possible solutions are 
the creation of a special SGP directed to the CEEC specificities, or the reformulation of the 
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II. 4. Labour Market 
(Tiiu Paas, Tartu) 
 
The beginning of transition brought significant social difficulties and new social 
problems emerged that were unknown in the previous communist societies: 
unemployment, increasing inequality, emergence of poverty and social exclusion. Though 
according to some quantitative measures the problems are perhaps not more severe than in 
Western Countries, the issues are urgent also because of the living previously in relatively 
egalitarian societies, the inhabitants of CEE countries are sometimes less willing to tolerate 
the existing inequalities, and the institutions meant to tackle with social issues (social 
protection systems) are lagging in their development behind the social needs. 
The enlargement of the European Union creates the potential of large movements 
of capital towards Central Europe precipitating the decline of the industry in Western 
Europe and leading to large asymmetric developments in the business cycles between East 
and West. Consequently, the Eastern enlargement of the European Union and the require-
ments of the European Monetary Union call for increased flexibility of labour markets in 
both the current EU members and candidate countries. If labour markets and institutions 
are rigid in the monetary union, market disequilibrium is likely to grow. 
Another issue is that the introduction of euro calls for higher levels of labour 
market flexibility. The Central and Eastern European countries labour markets are already 
now relatively flexible, and the concerns are that joining with the European Union might 
rather decrease the flexibility in the labour markets. The dark side of higher flexibility is 
that it implies lower job security (shorter average duration of employment relationship, 
more flows between unemployment and employment, more job creation and job 
destruction) and thereby in some aspect lower quality of life. The importance of trade 
unions is much smaller in CEE countries than in Western European countries.  
Labour market flexibility should be measured at two distinct levels: the macro level 
and the micro level. At a macro level the flexibility can be further divided into institutional 
and wage flexibility. The institutional flexibility of a labour market denotes to what extent 
state institutions and trade unions are involved in the regulation of the labour market. 
Wage flexibility shows how responsive wages are to market fluctuations. Micro level 
flexibility relates to labour market flow analyses. A labour market can be characterized by   40 
 
various flows of transitions to and from employment, unemployment and non-
participation, as well as flows of job creation and job destruction. In practice, different 
aspects of flexibility are interrelated, presumably in a hierarchical way. If institutional 
involvement is very high, workers’ transition rates are likely to be low. If trade unions are 
weak, then wages are more flexible. Thus, macro level flexibility can partly be measured 
via the indicators of micro level flexibility.  
Thus, the flexibility of European labour market means that workers are willing to 
accept a wage cut so as to keep firms in the country, and/or that workers are willing to 
move with the exiting firms to the countries that experience an economic expansion. If 
labour markets are flexible, their institutions allow to cut wages, labour force are ready for 
geographical mobility and able to adjust with the changes in wages (declining of wages) and 
in requirements to the qualifications and working skills.  
Presumably, there is a limit to what extent the citizens in Europe will accept in 
terms of flexibility. One reason of rather low flexibility of European labour market 
comparing to the U.S. labour market is the absent of a common language. Also impacts of 
the trade unions, other institutions, working habits and cultural traditions on the 
European country’s labour markets are significant.  
The job-less growth phenomena has been widely observed and perhaps can not be 
ruled out also when we talk about the impact of Eurozone enlargement. For instance, the 
increasing foreign direct investments and availability of financing could further encourage 
the replacement of low-skilled labour with capital and thereby decrease employment. 
Though the currently low wage level may help to preserve low-skilled jobs in CEE 
countries, the higher level of inflation erodes that advantage over the time. Important 
aspect here is the strictness of labour market institutions. The relatively moderate taxation 
of capital compared to the taxation of labour may foster such developments. 
What can happen if labour markets are not flexible enough?  
In the situation of asymmetric shocks some countries will have negative output 
shocks, while others will have positive ones. If the labour forces are not flexible and social 
security is organized at the national level, the budget situation of the country losing output 
deteriorates and unemployment goes up. As a result, the authorities of this country are 
forced to cut back on spending and to hike taxes. All this makes the economic condition 
precarious. Some of the countries hit by a negative shock may decide to let the budget   41 
 
deficit increase and may end up in an unsustainable debt situation leading to debt crises. 
Undoubtedly, the monetary union would be put under great strain. Some countries would 
blame the union for their misfortunes, creating political tensions and crisis. If the crisis 
were to go on, a disintegration of the union would be inconceivable. 
What to do? 
There are two simultaneous ways to avoid possible tensions and crisis. 
Implementing structural reforms that increase flexibility of labour markets 
(including also educational reforms, development of social policies, etc).  
Declining and aging European population needs big investments into human capital 
(education, training, health of people) in order to support flexibility of labour market and 
to avoid its disequilibrium.  
The social protection measures should be more targeted to the most vulnerable 
groups of population in order to avoid social exclusion.  
The requirements to employment protection regulations, minimum wages, social 
benefits and pensions should be less centralized taking into account specific conditions of 
the countries, the members of the enlarged EU. Centralized labour market institutions and 
strict labour regulations may reduce labour flexibility and increase unemployment. 
2) Providing both public and private insurance schemes against asymmetric shocks. 
These schemes allow transfer income from the countries enjoying  an expansion of their 
output to those countries hit by a negative output shock. 
There are two ways to put public insurance into operation, but both of them will 
often not function properly when countries need it most. 
Centralizing some part of the government budgets of the member countries at the 
European level in order to distribute this financial source in the case of asymmetric shocks. 
Of course, there is high probability that this insurance system may lead to a moral hazard 
problem. In the case when EU25 countries will be in trouble, the insurance mechanism 
through budgetary centralization will not be available. 
Using nationally based insurance mechanism that bases on the public debts.  This 
approach reduces the risk of moral hazard. At the same time, the nationally based 
insurance system is not always available. In particular governments with a high debt who 
faces a negative asymmetric shock cannot easily allow their budget deficit to increase.    42 
 
The private insurance scheme operates through the financial markets. To the extent 
that the Eurozone-25 will lead to the creation of a unified  financial market (integrated 
bound market), it also automatically creates its own insurance mechanism allowing 
countries that experience negative output shocks to obtain temporary compensation and to 
smooth their consumption. Of course, it is necessary to take into consideration that 
financial market provides insurance if markets function efficiently. If financial markets are 
not working efficiently, instead of an equilibrating force, they themselves may be a source 
of disturbances. In normal times (not in the conditions of bubbles and crashes) the financial 
market integration is an important insurance mechanism. But we should keep in mind that 
financial markets sometimes fail to provide this private insurance service and then they 
become a source of instability. In those times it is important to have a publicly provided 
insurance mechanism to back this up.  
Suggestions for policies.  
We suggest that the aim of social policies in the enlarged Eurozone should be 
targeted at sustainable development and the quality of human capital. That assumes flexible 
workforce, able to change the profession and job, that assumes among other things good 
basic education. In order to decrease the long term unemployment level, it is necessary to 
target active and possible labour policies though that people have access to necessary re-
training while incentives to work and to supply labour are not hurt by the replacement of 
income during the time of unemployment. The issue is whether the goal of policy should 
be economic efficiency subject to the constraints of social needs, or social needs subject to 
the constraints of economic efficiency. 
We emphasize the concept of sustainable development as it is usually understood 
(the needs of current generations are met without impeding future generations in meeting 
theirs to the same extent). The social situation of both generations can be improved by 
investing in infrastructure, technological development and human resources. 
An important policy question to be answered is how in the enlarged Eurozone to 
assist countries who have due to asymmetric shock fallen into economic difficulties. The 
usage of fiscal policies by accumulating budget deficits is constrained by Maastricht criteria 
(though enforcing these rules seems to be a tricky issue, as indicated by the policy of 
France and Germany). Some kind of possible insurance systems, by which countries having 
problems received payments from central funds, creates other problems (similarly to the   43 
 
other forms of insurance). For instance, a moral hazard problem will emerge if the 
individual countries have less incentives to avoid problems themselves, less incentives to 
follow sound macroeconomic policies et cetera. 
 
4.1  The Baltic States’ View 
The Baltic States have dutifully observed the main international standards regulating 
labour relations in accordance with the EU rules. Comparing the Baltic States’ labour 
market with those of EU15 and the other candidate countries, one comes to the conclusion 
that the Baltic States’ labour markets are flexible. The most flexible among them is the 
Estonian labour market followed by that of Latvia. However, predictably, after joining the 
EU, the labour markets of the new members may become more rigid due to the increasing 
influence on them of institutions and trade unions, and due to more generous funding of 
labour market policies. Moreover, a decline of wage flexibility can be predicted.  
Trade unions in the Baltic States, like in all the Central and East European 
countries, are rather small in terms of both union density and collective agreement 
coverage. The importance of trade unions has been declining in the CEE and Baltic 
countries since the beginning of the 1990s. At the end of the 1990s, trade union density was 
less than 35% in all the transition countries except Slovenia. In the Baltic States, trade 
union density is even smaller than the CEE countries’ average, with the highest density 
rate in Latvia. Collective agreement coverage in the Baltic States is not much higher than 
UE countries’ density. This is mainly due to the small number of sectional level 
agreements. Collective wage bargaining in the Baltic States takes place mainly at the 
enterprise or national level, while bargaining at sectional or regional level is less developed. 
Due to the low coverage by collective agreements, it can be concluded that the majority of 
employees in the Baltic States rely on individual employment contracts. 
The Baltic States’ labour policies are rather insufficiently funded in comparison 
with the EU, the share of active measures being relatively low. In Lithuania 40% and in 
Estonia even 60% of the overall employment policy budget is allocated on passive 
measures. At the same time, the overall coverage of the unemployed by the system of 
income maintenance is still low in all the three states. The status of the unemployed is 
regulated and they have several rights. In Latvia the unemployed enjoy higher   44 
 
unemployment benefits than in Lithuania and especially in Estonia, where the benefit is 
currently so small that an unemployed person has to apply for subsistence benefit as well. 
The participation of registered job seekers in active labour market measures is low 
as well. In accordance with the European Union’s employment guidelines, the goal is to 
achieve the involvement rate of 20% of unemployed people. At the moment, the respective 
number is largest in Estonia  10%, followed by 4% in Latvia and 3% in Lithuania. It 
could be concluded that, because of the undercapitalization of the labour market policy, 
unemployment benefits are low and therefore fail to remarkably decrease labour market 
flexibility. On the other hand, by laying more emphasis on active labour market programs, 
a positive impact of labour policy on labour market flexibility could be increased. In this 
context, more attention should be paid to education and training, including development 
of lifelong learning which is now an established priority throughout the EU. In Estonia 
one of the main problems is the poor targeting of the programs (e.g. the aid to starting 
business). In Lithuania there is a need to expand active labour market programs and re-
balance provision away from temporary work, in favor of training and other measures 
designed to increase employability. Also passive policies need to be reformed in Lithuania 
in order to improve coverage, eliminate disincentives, and emphasize activation rather than 
passive receipt of benefits. The public employment service should play a more active role 
in reintegrating the unemployed. 
Analyzing wage flexibility in the Baltic States, it is possible to admit that on the 
whole wages are rather flexible, but there are also differences between the countries and 
economic sectors. Nominal wages are most rigid in Lithuania and most flexible in Estonia. 
At the same time, minimum wages are lowest in Estonia and highest in Lithuania. The 
most flexible wages are in the construction sector in all the three countries. In Estonia and 
Latvia, wages are also flexible in fishing, agriculture, and the hotels and restaurants sector. 
The wages of the public sector and of the financial sector are mostly rigid. The data also 
confirm that if the wages are low, they are more flexible. In the context of EU 
enlargement, it is possible that wages in those sectors where they are most flexible will con-
verge faster with the EU wage level if EU labour market policies are liberalized. It may also 
happen that, if the Baltic States’ labour markets become as highly regulated as those of the 
EU, wage flexibility will decrease in all the three countries, but especially in Estonia. The 
last option is rather realistic.   45 
 
Why will the labour market of the Baltic States become more rigid?  
First, the influence of institutions will increase. From the formal point of view, the 
legal regulation of the labour market seems to be in place and the calculated indexes show 
that, on average, the worker is even better protected in the Baltic States than in the EU. 
However, in practice it is obvious that at the level of firms, the state regulations are not 
always complied with. There is a lot of evidence that these regulations have been violated, 
at least in the case of Estonia. The influence of institutions will grow because the control 
over observance of the regulations will increase, caused by increasing administrative 
capacity. 
This leads to the second point, the power of trade unions. At the moment, trade 
unions are very weak in all the three countries. We believe that trade unions are in the 
process of recovering and their strength, both in terms of density and coverage, is 
increasing. Firstly, more workers will start to realize that they need unions and will get 
organized. Secondly, unions will learn more from the past and will become more attractive 
and visible in society. Also sister organizations in the Nordic countries and the central EU 
level organizations will provide help to local trade unions, training local trade union 
managers, giving financial support, organizing joint seminars, etc. Thirdly, if trade unions 
start to expand and strengthen, wage flexibility will accordingly decline, because today the 
collective agreement coverage rates in the Baltic States are extremely low. Fourthly, the 
state should contribute more to labour policies and the share of active labour market 
programs should be increased.  
These tendncies will definitely decline the flexibility of labour markets and there 
exists a danger that in the nearest future we will have to grapple with the same labour 
market problems (long term unemployment, high labour turnover cost, weak motivation 
for job search), which are so common for the EU member states. In order to maintain 
sufficient economic growth, the Baltic States will have to reduce their unemployment rate, 
in particular, structural unemployment, and increase labour force participation. 
Free movement of labour as a natural consequence of EU eastward enlargement will 
have its impact on market disequilibrium particularly during the first years of enlargement. 
It will put pressure on the labour markets of the Baltic States due to the possible outflow of 
better-qualified and flexible labour force.    46 
 
Movers will be mainly people with good qualifications, also young people with a 
secondary school (gymnasium) education, who cannot find qualified jobs at home. They 
are ready to work abroad as blue collar workers, getting relatively higher salaries than they 
would expect to get in their home countries. Analyzing the labour migration problems of 
the Baltic States, attention should also be paid to the possible cross-border labour 
movements within the Baltic Sea Region. Cross-border movement is costly to the country 
of residence, which may lose the income tax revenue from the worker but has to finance 
the social expenditure and local infrastructure for the benefit of the workers’ family. 
 
 
II. 5. Social Dimension   
(Achim Kemmerling, Berlin) 
 
5.1  How to evaluate the social dimension of Ezoneplus 
Since the report has already deviated from standard economic accounts of 
integration processes, this contribution necessarily deals with normative evaluations of a 
(slightly) different form. The normative benchmark against which alternative policy 
proposals should be judged cannot be economic efficiency alone. From a perspective of 
political economy, policies also have to be, at least, also politically feasible in the short run, 
if not even socially acceptable in the long run. The reason for this is rather mundane: if 
policy proposals are made they may be economic first-best solutions, but if these proposals 
risk, for example, electoral defeat, their implementation is highly questionable. Hence, also 
from a normative perspective we should be interested in second-best policies that are both 
politically and economically preferable (Saint-Paul '00). In a broader view, ‘societies’ 
should even have an interest in guaranteeing support of most of its members, since, 
ultimately, political and economic welfare also depends on the extent of social acceptance 
of important political decisions. 
 
5.2  Welfare State and Social Policies 
The competition between tax and transfer systems could stir major irritations across 
nations, since it makes ‘globalisation’ plainly visible in its regional context. Though some 
economists may believe this is an efficient solution to the problems of stabilisation and   47 
 
structural reform (Siebert '97), political interactions between countries will necessarily 
distort these effects and could lead to less efficient outcomes. As in the case of the fear 
about wage dumping, social dumping looms large on the integration of a monetary union. 
CEECs may be tempted to export (unskilled) labour and import foreign direct investment 
to a degree that puts a strain on western governments (Boeri et al. '02).  
The economic problem behind the claim of social dumping is the externality of systems 
with different generosity of benefits and different tax burdens. Obviously rich people are 
tempted to move to low-tax countries, whereas poor people would rather opt for well-
endowed welfare states (Sinn '00). A series of recommendations has been suggested how to 
deal with this problem: (1) principles of discrimination, (2) and of harmonisation, (3) 
international compensation (cf. next part on EU transfers), (4) EU-level substitutes. The 
first recommendation stems from Sinn (Sinn '99) who argues that the best alternative to 
stop these processes of dumping would be to use a legal system of discrimination between 
national workers and immigrants. At least in the short term, migrating workers should be 
entitled only to their home country benefits, in order to stop this form of artificial 
incentives for migration. Most critics argue that this necessarily confronts the acquis 
communautaire, since EU law has abolished such practices of discrimination. Sinn argues 
that it is time for an entire review of the acquis. But there is also, still, the possibility of 
using this instrument for CEECs as the case of the FoS has shown.  
A second option is to harmonise systems across Europe, a suggestion which necessarily 
fails in the short run, because of a lack of common principles across European welfare 
states. It has been argued, for instance, to adopt a certain form of social minimum for each 
country as a function of its GDP p.c. (Scharpf '97). Unfortunately, the link between wealth 
and welfare state is far from perfect, and many countries would oppose such a suggestion. 
Rather, if rich western countries want to avoid excessive competition of CEECs in tax and 
transfer systems, they could also subsidise the expansion of the welfare state in these 
countries (Boeri, Bertola, Brücker, Coricelli, and al. '02: 18). Structural funds could be used 
as policy instrument to guarantee this form of monetary transfer between western and 
eastern Europe. These transfers, however, have to be conditional on the capacity building 
of these welfare states rather than to guarantee additional monetary transfers to welfare 
state recipients. Moreover, the kind of programs to be subsidized has to be chosen with   48 
 
care (Boeri, Bertola, Brücker, Coricelli, and al. '02: 19/20). Similar recommendations could 
apply to the issues of improving tax administration in CEECs.  
Ultimately, however, the EU has to think about the question how to implement a pan-
European social safety net that guarantees, at least, a social minimum acceptable to all 
countries (ibid. 21). Of course, this entails a lot more than all the other recommendations. 
It would mean nothing less than a complete revision and re-structuring of EU-level transfer 
policies, with which will deal in the following section. 
 
5.3  EU transfer and regulative policies 
A political-economy perspective would start from a different point of view. Maybe EU 
transfer policies are not so much due to efficiency considerations, but neither they are  - at 
least not exclusively – political rents. Inhabitants of eastern German Länder and French 
farmer seem to have pivotal power in their national political systems so that they have 
managed to secure their transfers at least for the medium run. This is astonishing since 
France had to negotiate a principle of discrimination versus Polish farmers and eastern 
Germans will have to get special provisions not to be kicked out of so-called Objective 1 
regions (Kemmerling '03).  
As Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi (Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi '03) argue that structural 
funds (SFs) may not so much be seen as a development policy but rather as a social policy. 
Most observers would agree that SFs have failed to achieve regional convergence in Europe, 
but it is quite likely that this has never been the foremost aim. Rather SFs, and to some 
extent, CAP-cash have impeded greater divergence that might have occurred since it is 
usually the urban clusters that benefit most from integration and FDI-inflows (Boeri, 
Bertola, Brücker, Coricelli, and al. '02; Caetano et al. '02: 47/48). In addition, there is some 
evidence that SFs and CAP raises the acceptability, if not legitimacy of the European 
Union (Mattila '01 also Austin ??)  
Nevertheless, it is obvious that monitoring the distribution of SFs has to be improved 
dramatically. Only some 10 per cent of SFs are invested in human capital (Rodríguez-Pose 
and Fratesi '03: 9), although these investments are arguably the most profitable of all SFs. 
Moreover, cross-national performance of cohesion countries has been very diverse. For the 
Irish and Iberian case, cohesion cash seems to have been beneficial, whereas little 
convergence, so far, has been visible in Greece. Nota bene that the cohesion fund is a facility   49 
 
introduced in order to account for the costs of structural adjustment as poor countries 
approaches EMU. As a consequence, it seems safe to argue that the true political conflict 
lies in the problem that rich countries may be forced to pay higher contributions, whereas 
political acceptance of such a policy is low among their national electorates. 
The source of this conflict lies in the potential of new members to re-negotiate their 
‘slices of the EU budget cake’ once they will be members of EU. Stylised forecasts show 
that new members, making use of their newly acquired political weight, could double their 
share of EU transfers (Kemmerling '03: 27/8). This holds for CAP-cash, since it is a 
deviation from EU legal practices to begin with, but also for SFs, albeit to a minor degree, 
since the take-up of SFs is not easy for poor countries due to the principle of co-financing 
projects. As a mirror image, budget quarrels loom large into current efforts of EU-15 
countries to introduce new voting rules in the legal corpus of the EU convent (König '01). 
Those efforts notwithstanding, it seems to be safe to argue that the EU will redistribute 
more money than before. But if this is the case, EU-15 countries should negotiate as hard as 
possible to introduce some levels of structural reforms to both SFs and CAP.  
The most radical approach is to do cross-country redistribution in the simple form of 
lump sum payments. Tabellini (Tabellini '03: 89) argues that if this redistribution is only 
due to smooth negotiations by giving side payments, the best answer is to do it 
unconditionally. Governments should know better how to buy consent among their 
electorate. This suggestion would also reduce the problem of mixed financing between 
different entities in fiscal federalism. Germany is a well-known example where this form of 
mixed financing has lead to notorious problems of accountability and decision-traps 
(Scharpf '94). But lump sum transfers are implemented, the EU-Commission will have to 
be compensated by other mechanisms how to guarantee a direct form of (output-oriented) 
legitimacy for European peoples.  
Apart from questions of institutional design, all these efforts are, however, only short-
term cures to a long-term problem. Both the problem of externalities in diverse tax 
systems, and the increasing demand for redistribution across member states, calls for the 
introduction of a common European tax (cf. Tabellini 93). In addition, there may be a 
more powerful, but admittedly also more opaque argument in favour of such a tax. If one 
lesson can be drawn from the modern history of democracy from a political economy 
perspective it is the principle that representation follows taxation. If a European demos, an   50 
 
identity or however you may call it, is to be created at all, a pervasive way to do that is to 
raise the stakes involved. The current problem of a lack of democracy in the EU, and the 
lack of political power of the European parliament, may be less due to the role of 
institutional rights. Ultimately, the power of  a parliament depends on the subject matter it 
has to decide upon. If high transfers and taxes are at stake, European electorates will have 
to become more interested in these parliamentary proceedings. 
 
 
II. 6. Some concluding remarks 
 
To summarize, CEECs should only access the euro area if they are able to forfeit the 
exchange rate as a monetary policy instrument. Fiscal stabilisation and flexibility of the 
labour market are then essential to counter asymmetric shocks to the real economy and 
adverse phases of the economic cycle.   
The Maastricht criteria require two years of stable exchange rate in the ERM 2. Since 
fixed exchange rate are exposed to speculative attacks, countries that are currently floating 
their currency could minimize the risk staying out of the ERM 2 until the beginning of the 
evaluation period; meanwhile, the role of anchoring the expectations should be left to an 
explicit inflation targeting; a formal and detailed programme of euro accession strategy may 
constitute a valid alternative especially for those countries where inflation targeting has not 
been implemented yet. Adopting the 15% oscillation band could be a second best solution.  
Of the countries currently having a fixed exchange rate, only Latvia is planning to 
postpone the accession to the euro area, thus entering an interim phase. Shifting the peg to 
the euro, it could try and exploit the credibility acquired in these years of fixed exchange 
rate entering the ERM 2 with very narrow bands, but keeping in mind that the goal in 
perspective is the accession to the euro area, and not the defence of the peg in the short 
term.  
Despite the exposition to speculative attacks, it is encouraging to notice that in the run 
up to the monetary union of Italy or Greece the “convergence play” helped these countries, 
increasing their credibility and leading them to a smooth accession to the euro. 
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